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This study analyzes Russian perceptions and narratives of the post-Cold War international 
order, with attention to both Russia’s role in this order and to Russia’s perceived special mission 
in post-Soviet space, or what is often referred to as the ‘near abroad.’ Although Russia’s visions 
of the world and post-Soviet space were constructed, to some extent, during the Soviet era, this 
study shows that the experience of the US-led world order has had a great impact on contemporary 
Russian discourse. America often misunderstands the factors that motivate and inspire 
contemporary Russia, in part because the end of the Cold War resulted in a decline in the effort to 
study and understand the region. This research, by closely examining concepts and issues such as 
the ‘Russian world,’ Eurasian integration, NATO enlargement, Ukraine, and others, will explain 
the direction in which Russia’s policy in post-Soviet space will develop in the near future. 
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Over the past few years, there have been policy discussions in the United States driven by 
concerns that Russia poses a real risk to regional and global security.1 According to numerous 
Western observers, Russia has been falling into “old habits” and implementing a hegemonic policy 
in the post-Soviet space.2 With Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and the ongoing conflict in 
Ukraine, American expertise and media outlets have been actively covering the narrative of Russia 
as “an autocratic, abusive, and revisionist power.” 3 There also has been a great deal of interest in 
Russia’s confrontation with the West as the illustration of the revival of the Cold War. However, 
this definition along with others that describe Russia’s behavior as excessively militaristic and 
hegemonic seems to refer to the Soviet Union to explain Russia’s current domestic and foreign 
policy strategies.  
Due to the lack of consistent study of Russia in the United States in the 1990s and early 
2000s, the United States faces the problem of understanding and perception of Russia’s actions in 
the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American establishment and academia’s 
interest in studying Russia fell significantly. The United States did not have a “Marshall Plan” for 
Russia in the 1990s as it had for Europe after 1945. The United States lost interest in Russia and 
the post-Soviet region, especially compared to the Cold War era. This, in turn, created a 
                                                
1 Robert Legvold, Return to Cold War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016); Robert Legvold, H-
Diplo/International Security Studies Forum 9, no.12 (2017): 1026. Retrieved from 
http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSFRoundtable-9-12.pdf. 
2 Lauren Goodrich, “Russia Falls Into Old Habits,” Stratfor, October 25, 2017, 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-falls-old-habits (accessed February 18, 2018); Jeanne 
L. Wilson, “The Russian Pursuit of Regional Hegemony,” Rising Powers Quarterly 2, no.1 
(February 2017): 7-25. 
3 Andrei Tsygankov, “The dark double: The American media perception of Russia as a neo-Soviet 
autocracy 2008-2014,” Politics 37, 1 (2016): 19. 
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generational gap in understanding contemporary Russia as a nation with its own legitimate 
interests that developed in its own way after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the United States, 
Russia is viewed as the country which defeated the Cold War; however, Russians believe that the 
Soviet Union did not lose the war, but “pulled out before it was over.”4 In other words, there are 
misunderstandings and misperceptions of the end of the Cold War between the two countries 
which had seriously affected American policies toward Russia. The US perception of Russia as a 
defeated country along with the loss of interest in the region resulted in American inability to 
project the development of post-Soviet Russia and to understand Russian vision of the international 
order and its position in the region.  
As Andrei Tsygankov, Professor at San Francisco State University, aptly puts it, 
“Struggling to understand the country’s transition from the USSR, the US media commonly 
describes Russia in terms of fitting within its old pattern. Media frequently assess contemporary 
Russian politics not on the scale of how far it has gotten away from the Soviet Union, but, rather, 
how much Russia became a Soviet-like ‘one-party state’ driven by a ‘KGB mentality’ and 
dependent on the use of propaganda, ‘Cold War rhetoric’, and repression against internal 
opposition in order to consolidate state power.”5  
The representation of Russia as a “neo-Soviet autocracy,” which is often personified by 
Vladimir Putin (as it was done with Joseph Stalin during the Soviet Union), replaces a deeper 
analysis of Russia’s behavior in the region and its perceptions and, thus, can hardly be an effective 
tool for understanding as well as explaining the direction of Russian policy in the post-Soviet 
                                                
4 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Peresroika 2014. The Reasons Behind Moscow’s Firm Stance on Ukraine,” 
Valdai Discussion Club, March 19, 2014, 
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/perestroika_2014_the_reasons_behind_moscow_s_firm_stanc
e_on_ukraine/ (accessed January 15, 2018). 
5 Tsygankov, “The dark double,” 20. 
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space. I argue that the American expertise lacks an accurate vision of contemporary Russia and 
precise understanding of what currently drives Russia in the post-Soviet region.  
This study addresses the issue of trends and discourses that are predominant among the 
Russian political elite and foreign policy experts dealing with post-Soviet space.6 Drawing 
primarily from the Russian political elite’s statements, popular discourses in Russia, and the expert 
community views, this research shares the original Russian perceptions of the world order, threats, 
and its narratives of post-Soviet space. It analyzes Russian perceptions and narratives of the post-
Cold War international order, with attention to both Russia’s role and to Russia’s special mission 
in the post-Soviet space in order to better understand Russia’s future direction in the region. It also 
analyzes the conditions under which the Russian visions of the world order and threats were 
produced. Though Russia’s visions of the world and the post-Soviet space were constructed, to 
some extent, during the Soviet era, the study shows that the experience of the US-led world order 
had a great impact on the contemporary discourse.  
The focus on the logic and arguments that Russia uses in its relations with its near 
neighborhood can be much more valuable as an explanation of the direction of Russian politics in 
the post-Soviet space. This research, by closely examining current debates in the Russian expert 
community, will show the direction in which foreign policy of Russia in the post-Soviet space will 
develop in the near future. Moreover, it will throw light on how the Kremlin would most likely to 
respond to potential challenges. 
                                                
6 Though the post-Soviet space does not exist as a political unit anymore, the notion of the post-
Soviet space is rather psychological and inertial in nature: it exists in the minds of politicians and 
the public, but not in the reality. In this study, I use the definition of the ‘post-Soviet space’ mainly 
because this notion is actively used in the official documents and statements of the Russian 
political leadership as well as in the research of Russia foreign policy analysts whose work I am 
researching here. 
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This study is organized as follows. The first chapter discusses the state of Russian Studies 
in the United States and identifies current American assumptions of Russia. It also attempts to find 
specific gaps and misperceptions in studying contemporary Russia in the United States. The 
second chapter provides Kremlin’s official narratives of the world order and threats within the 
existing order. Furthermore, it explores Russia’s perception of its position in the world and its 
special mission in the post-Soviet space expressed in policy documents and President Putin’s 
speeches. The third chapter focuses on current debates prevailing in the Russian expert community 
– a world often ignored in America –  regarding Russia’s policy in post-Soviet space. Though in 
general the Russian elite and foreign policy experts’ views are mostly consistent, experts have 
distinctive ideas from the political establishment regarding some issues and go further in their 
analysis. In this sense, the discourse and views of Russian leading experts can lay a pathway and 




THE STATE OF RUSSIAN STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES	
With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia was no longer perceived to be 
significant in the eyes of the American establishment. This was reflected in the drastic decline of 
funding for Russian studies which, in turn, resulted in a decrease in the number of scholars and 
intelligence analysts in the United States who specialized in the post-Soviet space. In 2012, there 
were no more than 1000 intelligence analysts in the United States who specialized in Russia, 
compared to 13,000 specialists during the Cold War.7 Likewise, the quantity and quality of Russia-
related research have decreased immensely over the past few decades. To some extent, when the 
Soviet Union collapsed, the United States saw the collapse of Russia. 
Due to the lack of comprehensive and consistent research on Russia during the 1990s and 
2000s, there are misperceptions of what is going on in Russia from the American side. This 
misunderstanding resulted in miscalculation regarding Russia’s foreign policy. Today, American 
perceptions of Russia, to some extent, remain stuck in a Cold War frame.8 However, in contrast to 
the Cold War era, when the main challenge for the United States was the lack of access to sources 
due to the closed character of the Soviet system, today America faces a different problem. The 
decision makers of American foreign policy misunderstand or in most cases do not want to 
understand the distinctive political and social system of contemporary Russia. In other words, the 
United States faces a lack of a comprehensive understanding of what Russia is today, that, to a 
large extent, was caused by a generational gap in studying Russia and the post-Soviet space as well 
                                                
7 “Think Tank Atlas: Russian Studies Abroad Report,” Rethinking Russia, 2016, 
http://rethinkingrussia.ru/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Think-Tank-Atlas.pdf (accessed 
January 20, 2018). 
8 Tsygankov, “The dark double,” 34. 
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as the lack of continuous monitoring of the situation in the region. As the experts note, “the 
tradition of ‘know your enemy’ was never entirely transformed into a program of ‘know your 
friend.’”9 There never was a Russian studies field before the early 1990s, but a Soviet Studies that 
dealt with a geographic and political unit that currently does not exist. Besides, Russia today has 
no driving ideology that would direct the country the way it did during the Soviet era.  
In light of current tensions between the United States and Russia over Ukraine and 
meddling in the 2016 presidential election, Russia is once again perceived as a challenge, if not a 
threat. Today, the desire of the American establishment to learn Russia, as well as its 
socioeconomic development and a distinctive political system, is rather urgent.  
In order to understand where the incomplete perception of Russia lies in the United States, 
it is necessary to analyze the state of Russian Studies in the US, its roots, and prevailing trends in 
studying Russian matters in the academia and the expert community. This chapter aims to show 
how the narratives of Russia have been developing over the course of several decades, and what 
the experts on Russia assume about Russia and its legitimate interests. Therefore, the chapter seeks 
to identify the problem of misperception that currently exists in studying Russia in the United 
States. 
 
Soviet Studies during the Cold War 
Soviet Studies was exclusively a product of the Cold War. Before the end of the World War 
II there was not a field called Soviet Studies, but Slavic Studies that engaged in the history, culture, 
and languages of the Slavic areas in general. The interest in the Soviet Union was intense – decision 
                                                
9 “Think Tank Atlas: Russian Studies Abroad Report.” 
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makers needed experts with a solid knowledge of the Soviet Union in order to shape policy towards 
the country. 
The desperate need for experts who understood the nature of the new world power – the 
Soviet Union – and its regime and people was the primary stimulus to Soviet Studies in the period 
immediately following World War II. Due to the lack of contact with and access to the Soviet 
Union, Soviet life was “even more of an enigma.” As David Engerman puts it, “the need for good 
information about the Soviet Union was as great as the obstacles to obtaining it.”10 In this sense, 
the need for more specialists who would have an understanding of what was behind Stalin’s 
decisions was particularly necessary. Those who had direct experience with the Soviet Union were 
in great demand and could jump to government positions in a short period of time. One of them 
was George Kennan who had worked at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and made his career from 
the National War College and then to the State Department’s internal think tank in a matter of 
months.  
In the beginning of the Cold War, the American political establishment agreed that the best 
defense strategy against the Soviet Union was the policy of “containment.” In his “Long Telegram” 
in 1946, George Kennan explained this strategy: The Soviet Union was “a political force 
committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi.” 
Therefore, the United States chose to follow the policy of “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”11 Soon, in his famous article “The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct” (“The X Article”), George Kennan gave a theoretical justification to the policy 
                                                
10 David Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 25. 
11 “The Long Telegram,” GSCE Modern World History Revision Site, 
http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war7_Kennan.htm (accessed February 15, 2018). 
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of “containment” toward the Soviet Union as the only permissible form of relations between the 
states belonging to opposing social systems. He argued that Soviet leaders are “captives of 
ideology,” with whom one cannot cooperate on a usual basis. From his point of view, the only 
condition for the possible normalization of Soviet-American relations is the departure of Soviet 
foreign policy from “ideology.” Moreover, the policy of “deterrence” actually meant, as its goal, 
internal changes in Soviet society.12 This way of thinking shaped American foreign policy for the 
next several decades. 
The first institutions of Cold War Soviet Studies – Columbia University’s Russian Institute 
and Harvard’s Russian Research Center – were shaped by the wartime experience between 
academia and government. World War II brought social science into diplomacy: scholars joined 
government research teams, intelligence, and military projects. The professor-consultant was a 
fundamentally new role for university faculty and was a new enterprise unprecedented in academic 
life. 
Both foundations and government funding of Cold War Soviet Studies were broad and 
provided scholars with a great deal of autonomy. The key institutions of Soviet Studies – Harvard’s 
Russian Research Center and Columbia’s Russian Institute – were supported by the Carnegie 
Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation respectively. Since 1947, the Ford Foundation 
contributed $1 million per year to American universities to support area studies and became a 
major funding source for international studies in the United States. By 1960, the Ford Foundation 
and the State Department were each contributing upward of $300,000 per year to support 
American-Soviet scholarly exchange programs.13 The reason why foundations supported area 
                                                
12 X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (1947): 566. 
13 Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 78. 
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studies was more than a means for studying enemies, but as an instrument of “spurring more 
cosmopolitan general education and promoting interdisciplinary research.”14  
Soviet Studies was comprised of not only history, policy, and economics of the region, but 
also all aspects of life in the Soviet Union, including language, culture, and everyday practices of 
Soviet citizens. Focus on all elements of Soviet life, particularly on human behavior, required an 
interdisciplinary approach that combined social science with anthropology, sociology, and 
psychology. 
Studying the enemy meant learning various issues: what motivated people to follow the 
regime, how power was diffused, how cultures interacted, how to measure economic growth. Alex 
Inkeles, in his book, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, analyzed “the structure and functioning” of 
Soviet media and showed “the extent to which the Soviet regime relied on persuasion.”15 In the 
book, Factory and Manager in the USSR, economist Joseph Berliner demonstrated the centrality 
of material incentives in the Soviet economy through an explanation of the “effectiveness of 
bonuses paid to managers who had fulfilled their plan allotment.”16 Sociologists Mark Field and 
Kent Geiger wrote articles on Soviet demography, family dynamics, and public health. In 1953, 
Merle Fainsod published his book, How Russia Is Ruled, which became the main source on the 
theory and practice of public administration in the Soviet Union.17 A summary report to the Air 
Force and the book, How the Soviet System Works (1956), by the Harvard Refugee Interview 
                                                
14 Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 78. 
15 Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). 
16 Joseph S. Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1957). 
17 Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
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Project identified splits in the Soviet Union that could be potentially used in warfare. All of these 
works were also crucial to understanding Soviet society.18 
Sponsors funded projects that were far from immediate policy issues, such as Soviet 
literature, exchanges to libraries, and archives. In addition to the study of the Politburo, 
foundations funded special projects that studied everything from Pushkin to Bulgakov, all in order 
to get insights into Brezhnev. 
The development of an interdisciplinary approach to science and knowing the Soviet Union 
went hand in hand. They both represented a tool for each other: scholars expected that the study 
of the Soviet Union would contribute to social scientific knowledge while policymakers used 
social science as an instrument for knowing the Communist enemy. As Engerman aptly puts it, “If 
the war against Germany and Japan was the physicists’ war, many academics saw the brewing 
conflict with the USSR as the social scientists’ war.”19 In this regard, the “new social sciences” 
shaped the postwar period as much as “atomic physics had shaped the war itself.”20 
Soviet Studies grew intensively in the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid-1960s, Soviet Studies 
was no longer confined to the Ivy League: numerous centers and institutes of Soviet Studies were 
opened in public universities in Berkeley, Bloomington, Ann Arbor, Urbana-Champaign, and Los 
Angeles. The number of Soviet area centers almost doubled between 1959 and 1964, from 
seventeen to thirty-three. With this trend, the number of graduate students who completed doctoral 
degrees in Soviet Studies grew rapidly. 
                                                
18 Raymond Augustine Bauer et al., How the Soviet System Works (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1956). 
19 Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 18. 
20 Alex Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World: Observations in the Use of the Social 
Sciences (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1949), 43-44. 
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A new contribution to Soviet Studies came to the conclusion of an American-Soviet cultural 
exchange agreement in early 1958, when twenty-two American graduate students were exchanged 
in the first academic year.21 This agreement finally allowed American scholars and students to visit 
the object of their study. 
In the first decade of the Cold War, the combination of wide interest and financial support 
from both government and foundations allowed Soviet Studies to grow broadly and deeply. The 
research works and insights of the first Soviet specialists not only helped to moderate America’s 
Soviet policy during the Cold War but provided the government with specialists and supplied the 
next generation of experts with necessary data. Indeed, the successes of Soviet Studies resulted 
from unrepeatable historical circumstances, such as the intellectual mobilization during and after 
World War II, the willingness of both establishment and academia to cooperate with each other, 
and the emergence of new sources of funding.  
However, by the late 1950s, Soviet Studies became a highly politicized field imbued with 
topical issues and a know-the-enemy d’etre. It was the product of the Cold War “stamped by Cold 
War politics, political conformism, and government support”22. As Stephen Cohen notes, 
Sovietology became the “totalitarianism school” that focused “scholarly attention solely on the top 
of the political hierarchy to the exclusion of Soviet society and ruled out the possibility of any 
political, let alone social, change.”23 
With the increased scale of research in the 1970s and the expansion of a policy track within 
Soviet Studies, Sovietology became more crowded and dispersed than any of the other regional 
                                                
21 Cyril Black and John M. Thompson, American Teaching About Russia (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1959), 15. 
22 Stephen Cohen, “Scholarly Missions: Sovietology as a Vocation” in Stephen Cohen, Rethinking 
the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917 (Oxford, 1985), 29-33. 
23 Stephen Cohen, “Russian Studies Without Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 15, no. 1 (1999): 37-55. 
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specializations. Such a tendency caused the growing tensions in the field in the 1970s and 1980s 
and eventually created a significant gap between academic and policy worlds in Soviet Studies. 
This transformation undercut the primary goal of area studies as proposed in the 1940s: “to bring 
together the once-divided roles of social scientist and humanist, graduate advisor and government 
consultant.” Therefore, Sovietology was divided into two camps: academic and policy-oriented 
spheres. Those focused on the policy track received limited training: they were more concentrated 
on policy issues, receiving less practice in language and culture as well as spending less time in 
the regions they studied.24 
By the late 1980s, an increasing number of experts who focused in the policy track of Soviet 
Studies entered the highest positions of the executive branch: Jack Matlock, a career Foreign 
Service officer (M.A., Columbia), who worked at the National Security Council and then served 
as ambassador in Moscow from 1987 to 1991; Condoleezza Rice (Ph.D., University of Denver) 
left Stanford University to join the National Security Council staff during 1989-1991; and 
Madeleine Albright (Ph.D., Columbia, where she studied with Zbigniew Brzezinski) was Bill 
Clinton’s Secretary of State in 1997. 
However, unlike the Cold War era policymakers, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, Marshall 
Shulman, and Richard Pipes, as critics note, new post-Cold War politicians had less presence in 
Soviet Studies. Many of them conducted their research and did training on institutions that did not 
survive the Cold War: the Warsaw Pact, Soviet party organs, union-wide institutions, and others.25 
This new tendency in Soviet Studies that lacked a comprehensive and historic approach later 
generated significant consequences for American foreign policy in the post-Soviet world. 
                                                
24 Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 336. 
25 Ibid. 
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Russia in US foreign policy agenda in the 1990s 
With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the interest in Russia did not completely 
fade, but the extent and the direction were changed. The goal of the Bush administration was the 
transition from the command economy to the free market. But in a sense, the United States behaved 
as if they knew the answers to questions about the development of the world after the end of the 
Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet socialist economy, Americans thought that Russia 
inevitably had to take the direction towards democracy and free market based on Western 
standards. And, thus, according to Francis Fukuyama, this was supposed to be the “end of 
history.”26 
President George H.W. Bush’s ideological orientation on international affairs basically was 
the policy of noninterference toward Russia. According to James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 
“For President Bush and his administration, the primary challenge was to manage a peaceful 
transition from the old order to the post-Cold War world order.”27 Thus, the Bush administration 
was more concerned with ensuring the non-emergence of a rival power to American hegemony in 
a post-Soviet world and was less focused on promoting democratic transition within post-Soviet 
countries.  
Although the Bush administration welcomed Gorbachev’s reforms, they never engaged with 
policies that might foster the process of domestic change or promote it in a specific direction. For 
the Bush administration, reform was an internal matter to which the United States should only 
react, but not interfere. However, at the same time, the Bush administration was concerned about 
                                                
26 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 1st ed. (New York: Free Press, 
1992). 
27 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After 
the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 9. 
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radical regime transformation in post-Soviet countries. The case of Yugoslavia in 1991 was a vivid 
example of the terrible consequences generated by a socio-political transition in multiethnic 
countries. In this sense, the Bush administration primarily focused its foreign policy agenda on 
avoiding the repetition of a Yugoslav scenario of civil war in the post-Soviet space. 
One of the main tasks of the Bush team was the ultimate transfer of the nuclear warheads 
from the former Soviet Union. In particular, Secretary of State James Baker set to achieve the 
denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine that was eventually achieved during the 
Clinton presidency.  
In addressing issues of economic assistance to post-Soviet countries, the Bush administration 
remained true to its orientation to the idea of noninterference and played a limited role in Russia’s 
transition to a free-market system. The primary focus was to ensure that Russia would avoid 
defaulting on its debt rather than to establish assistance for developing a viable market economy.28  
In essence, the Bush administration’s message to Russia and other post-Soviet countries was, 
“If you want acceptance into the West, you have to do X, Y, and Z. Get the nuclear situation under 
control. Commit to paying your debt.” 29 In other words, the Bush administration was more 
concerned about what Russia could do for the United States, not what the United States could do 
for Russia. 
Whereas Bush was a power balancer in international politics, his successor, Bill Clinton and 
key decision makers in his foreign policy team were Wilsonian liberals who believed that the active 
enlargement of market economies in the post-Soviet area could serve as a way to ensure the 
national security of the United States.30 Clinton particularly believed that democratic regime 
                                                




transformation in Russia along with the establishment of free market economy would foster 
Russian integration into the Western community of democratic states which would automatically 
promote the national security of the United States.  
As Lawrence Summers, a senior U.S. Treasury Department official throughout Clinton’s 
administration had said, “The task of rebuilding the Russian economy is the greatest economic 
restructuring job since the Marshall Plan.”31 Indeed, the mission to replace communism with 
capitalism and democracy in Russia was a gigantic task of “nation-building” the likes of which 
had never taken place in history. The Clinton administration significantly raised aid funding, but 
even a billion dollars a year was a small amount of money in post-communist Russia with its large 
territory and numerous problems.32 This meant that the Clinton administration had to make 
strategic choices about what to finance and how to finance. Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary 
of State under President Clinton, aptly notes, “It seemed to me that the Bush people didn’t have 
much of a plan for economic assistance. They just grabbed what they could off the shelf. My 
criticism of us is that we had a plan, but it didn’t conform as much to reality as hindsight we wished 
it had. [Treasury officials Lawrence Summers and David Lipton] deserve a lot of credit for having 
quite a sophisticated analysis and strategy but reality didn’t cooperate and the Russians didn’t 
cooperate.”33  
Yet if Clinton accentuated the importance of the democratic transformation, in reality, 
Clinton made the decision “to stand by Yeltsin no matter what he did”: be it the parliament taken 
in a tank battle the invasion of Chechnya by Russia. For the Clinton team, “Yeltsin the man was 
                                                
31 Elaine Sciolino, “Clinton Adds Visit from Russian Official on Aid,” New York Times, March 
19, 1993, A5. 
32 Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 119. 
33 Interview with Strobe Talbott, in Goldgeier, McFaul, Power and Purpose, 124. 
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reform”, while his rivals were unacceptable and embodied the possible return to communism.34 As 
Talbott later admits, Yeltsin afterward was increasingly understood as a flawed and limited regime 
transformer.  
If Bush’s message to Russia was “transform yourself and then you can join the club”, 
Clinton’s message was “we will help you to transform the system so you can integrate with us”. 
The Clinton administration began the mission of political and economic transformation of Russia 
full of optimism, but initial plans did not justify themselves. As it turned out, the more the Clinton 
administration learned about the Russian regime, the more impracticable their mission seemed.35 
The problem is that the US showed no interest in Russia itself, and they were not interested 
in the real state of affairs in the country. The Americans focused exclusively on the knowledge 
they could share with the Russians in order to facilitate and accelerate the transition. Issues such 
as Russian culture, history, and mindset were never taken into account. Virtually no one was ready 
to admit that Russia could choose a different direction. The expert community, with the support of 
the government and the media, was actively seeking confirmation of its correctness regarding the 
transition in accordance with the American scenario. Less attention was paid to what was really 
happening in Russia. Russian foreign policy was completely ignored and Russia was no more 
perceived as a significant actor.  
As Stephen Cohen remarks, America knew “next to nothing about Russia, except that it had 
an economy… Some were certain that for their purpose there were no fundamental differences 
between Russia and Poland.”36 The lack of historical knowledge and disregard of the 
unprecedented case by policymakers led to the making of plans that could not be implemented. 
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After the financial crisis of 1998 and the first years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, it 
became clear that the transition process was not proceeding in the way that it was expected by the 
American establishment. Experts on the issues of “democratic transition” were not intellectually 
prepared for the different scenarios of the effect of the reforms. Despite the fact that they studied 
Russian life, the American expert community did not understand the essence of what was 
happening in the country. As Thomas Graham notes, for almost a quarter of the century the 
problem has not been the decline of interest in Russia, but the lack of emphasis on Russia itself in 
Russian studies.37 
 
Current vision of Russia in the United States  
Experts emphasize the general decline of area studies in the United States over the last 
several decades.38 This can be traced to the decline of a strong focus on languages, literature, and 
culture combined with the analysis of the history and politics of the region. Due to decreased 
government funding for Russia-related research, foreign language instruction at universities and 
cultural exchange programs with former Soviet states in the 1990s and the 2000s, the United States 
faced trouble developing a new generation of Russia specialists in the early 2010s.39 According to 
the report prepared by the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies, this decline 
generated three problems.40 First, Sovietologists have lost the incentive to develop their skills and 
sustain their research potential. Today most of them analyze Moscow’s internal and external 
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policies in comparison with journalists, trying to look at Russia through “the prism of stereotypes 
and clichés.” A second problem is the absence of young specialists. Stephen Hanson and Blair 
Ruble emphasize that specialists trained and hired in the Soviet era are approaching the retirement 
age.41 In the 1990s and 2000s, students and young scholars would rather study other regions, such 
as Asia and the Middle East, as their area study of choice. As a result, today the government has 
an insufficient number of trained experts who specialize on Russia. And this leads to the third 
problem – the impact of the misperception and miscalculation of Russia on decision-makers. 
Nowadays, it is difficult to find senior government officials specializing in Russia who are 
experienced in working in the area, except for a few figures, such as Fiona Hill, current senior 
director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council, Celeste Wallander, a former 
senior director for Russia and Eurasia on the National Security Council, and Victoria Nuland, a 
former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs during the Obama 
administration. 
Thus, the lack of consistent expertise on Russia during the post-Soviet era resulted in the 
miscalculation of Russia’s foreign policy actions. As Daniel Satinsky, President of the Board of 
Directors of the US-Russia Chamber of Commerce of New England, pointed out during the 
discussion on the state of Russian Studies in the United States, Russia’s foreign policy “shouldn’t 
be a surprise for those who carefully followed Russia’s concerns over the threat of global terrorism 
and the implications of the Arab Spring, as well as disturbances in the post-Soviet space. In reality, 
Russia’s policy was straightforward, consistent and explicit.”42 
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Robert Legvold, an American political scientist specializing in Russia and former Soviet 
states, believes that the US government and the public need specialists who can help overcome the 
stereotypes-driven perception of Russia. In order to achieve that, experts need to focus more on 
Russian history and literature since this approach will contribute to understanding the scale of 
historic transformations in Russia and the changes in Russians’ mentality and emotions.43 
In the United States, Russia is viewed as the country which was defeated in the Cold War. 
Thus, in the eyes of Americans, following this vision, Russians feel resentful by the loss of the 
Soviet Union. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, in this sense, mean retaliation and balancing against 
the United States as a way to prove Russia’s power and importance.44 However, from the Russian 
perspective, the Soviet Union did not lose the Cold War – the Soviet Union collapsed because of 
its internal economic and political inefficiency, not as a result of external forces. Russian foreign 
policy expert Fyodor Lukyanov also points out why Russia is not willing to restore the Soviet 
Union and why Russians think that they did not lose the Cold War: “The Kremlin’s goal is not to 
restore the country that fell apart in December 1991, because it considers some of the former Soviet 
territories unnecessary. Rather, it wants to replay the final phase of the Cold War. People in Russia 
– first small groups and then the majority of society – believe that the Soviet Union did not lose 
the Cold War, but pulled out before it was over. They believe that the Soviet leadership did this 
because they naively accepted the idea of universal human values, whereas a growing number of 
conspiracy theorists argue that the country was betrayed.”45 Even more, after the breakup of the 
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Soviet Union, Russia tried to make itself a friend to the United States, but America has instead 
surrounded Russia with NATO members and repeatedly tried to weaken, control, or even destroy 
Russia, according to Russian popular discourse. Thus, Russians view their country as insecure 
against the powerful United States. In this sense, Russian actions perceived as “aggressive” are 
actually defensive.46  
Vladimir Lukin, a prominent Russian diplomat and former ambassador to the US, once 
noted Russian vision and how Americans misunderstand it: “America has a simple ideology – that 
there is only one truth in the world, that truth is held by God, and God created the United States to 
be an embodiment of that truth. So the Americans strive to bring this truth to the rest of the world 
and to make it happy. Only after that will everything be well. This ideology has a strong influence 
on their policy. A wise traditionalist and a geopolitical expert, Kissinger had good reason to call 
such politicians “Trotskyites” for advocating a world revolution, albeit in their own way, but 
always in the front and in shining armor. This is a tempting ideology and has been processed by 
different countries at different times, not only the United States.”47  
This narrative of aggressive America is consistent to those in the Kremlin as well as the 
majority of Russian people. According to this view, American policies are in numerous ways 
motivated by a hatred of Russia and desire to destroy it. Following this, it becomes obvious that in 
the mind of Russian people Russia is not a defeated country; it is a new country that was formed 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And in response to the American hegemonic power, Russia 
has had no choice but to react to US aggression with defensive actions. The rhetoric that Russia is 
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under constant threat from the aggressive United States is more than government propaganda; it is 
the accepted worldview.  
“The contemporary vilification of Russia may be less about the rationalization of US 
interests and policies and more about the affirmation of an American identity,” once stated David 
S. Foglesong, Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University. In his book The American 
Mission and the “Evil Empire:” The Crusade for a “Free Russia” since 1881, Foglesong explores 
the American representation of Russia over 130 years and identifies three of the most prevailing 
notions of Russia in America: first, a messianic faith that America could inspire overnight 
transformation from autocracy to democracy; second, a notion that despite historic differences, 
Russia and America are very much akin, so that Russia, more than any other country, is America’s 
“dark double;” third, an extreme antipathy to “evil” leaders who Americans blame for thwarting 
what they believe to be the natural triumph of the American mission. As a result, these expectations 
and views continue to influence the way American journalists and politicians perceive and see 
Russia. Foglesong’s hope is that “by seeing how these attitudes have distorted American views of 
Russia for more than a century, we may begin to be able to escape their grip.”48 
Foglesong argues that the US political elite today condemns and underrate the Russian 
establishment in order to gain favor with particular domestic groups. He remarks that the American 
media regularly presents the image of Russia as a prison, with President Putin as its warden.49 This 
current image of Russia as a prison, as Foglesong notes, resembles pictures of Russia that were 
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developed in the late XIX century by George Kennan “The Elder,” who described in his book 
Siberia and the Exile System a vast territory beyond the Ural Mountains as a place of exile of the 
best people of Russia. This was the period when Russia started to be considered as America’s 
“dark double.” As Foglesong posits, “Russia was especially suited for this role of dark double 
because its people were believed to be – at least potentially – very much like Americans; they were 
white, nominally Christian, and had shared the frontier experience of expanding across a 
continent.” Thus, according to Foglesong, these similarities between Russia and America 
supported the point that Russians could be converted, in both political and religious sense, by the 
American mission.50 
In contemporary American narratives of Russia, along with the messianic perception of the 
American mission toward Russia, there is also a predominant stereotype of “good Russian people 
vs. bad Russian government.” In other words, Americans separate the Russian political 
establishment from the Russian people. However, the public polls in Russia show a high level of 
the approval of President Putin’s activities as the President of Russia. For example, 83 percent of 
Russians approved Putin’s presidency in 2017 in comparison with 63 percent in 2013. Unlike 
President Putin, only 42 percent of Russians approved of the activities of the Russian government 
in 2017.51  
In the 1990s, Russia seemed to have ceased to play the role of “constituting the Other” for 
the United States, nevertheless, the issue of “Russian intervention” in the presidential election in 
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2016 shows that the accumulated images of the “Russian threat” can be still easily updated in 
American political discourse.52  
Many American political scientists starting from Francis Fukuyama ending with Fareed 
Zakaria consider the ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the US as an impetus 
for the development and maintenance of liberal democracy. With the disappearance of the rival 
state, liberal democracy entered the period of crisis. But in Russia, politicians, and citizens still 
compare their own policies and problems with the United States. Comparison with the United 
States remains the most important point of substantiation of any new law or political decision, 
from the law on “foreign agents” to the annexation of Crimea. But this comparison is used not 
only by politicians; it remains a part of people’s everyday life.53 
In order to explain what is behind Russia’s actions and behavior, American historian 
Stephen Kotkin identifies three driving factors that shaped Russia’s role in the world: first, the 
sense of having a special mission; second, Russia’s unique geography; and, third, Russia’s 
perennial quest for a strong state.54 According to Kotkin, Russia’s reluctance to join international 
organizations is explained by its sense of a special mission. It provides Russians and their leaders 
with pride, but also with “resentment toward the West for supposedly underappreciating Russia’s 
uniqueness and importance.”55  
Having unique geography, with no natural borders, except the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic 
Ocean, Russia has felt constantly vulnerable and has often “displayed a kind of defensive 
                                                
52 Ivan Kurilla, Zaklyatye druzya. Istoriya mneniy, fantaziy, kontaktov, vzaimo(ne)ponimaniya 
Rossii I SShA (Chto takoe Rossiya?) (Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2017), 332. 
53 Kurilla, Zaklyatye druzya, 333. 
54 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics. Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern,” 
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-
18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics (accessed January 30, 2018). 
55 Ibid. 
 24 
aggressiveness.” As Kotkin writes, “Whatever the original causes behind early Russian 
expansionism – much of which was unplanned – many in the country’s political class came to 
believe over time that only further expansion could secure the earlier acquisitions. Russian security 
has thus traditionally been partly predicated on moving outward, in the name of preempting 
external attack.”56 
And, finally, Russia’s constant pursuing of a strong and powerful state “willing and able 
to act aggressively in its own interests” has been seen to Russian leaders as the only guarantor of 
Russia’s security. Today, even smaller neighboring countries are viewed “less as potential friends 
than as potential beachheads for enemies” and can be used as weapons of the Western powers 
intent on destabilizing Russia. Thus, Russia’s foreign policy orientation is “as much a condition 
as a choice.” The concept of a strong state also implies the domestic order; however, the efforts to 
create a strong state have led to “subverted institutions and a personalized rule,” according to 
Kotkin. He refers to Russian historian Vasily Klyuchevsky that once noted, “The state grew fat, 
but the people grew lean.”57 
Some scholars believe that misperception between Russia and the US has been due to 
divergent fundamental values and state interests, as each country has defined them. For Russia, 
the highest value is the state. In the case of the United States, it is individual liberty, private 
property, and human rights. Similarly, in their book Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and 
International Relations, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin emphasize the US and Russia’s 
identity narratives.58 During and after the Cold War, America has retained an identity narrative 
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that highlights US hegemony and a commitment to liberty, democracy, and human rights. On the 
contrary, the Russian identity, which basically was connected to the Soviet identity, has to create 
itself anew after the demise of the Soviet Union. The political elite has struggled to develop a new 
identity. Under President Putin, Russian nationalism, or as Russians say, the sense of patriotism, 
became the new identity narrative: “We don’t have and there can’t be any other unifying idea, 
apart from patriotism.”59 According to Kotkin, Russia today is “not a revolutionary power 
threatening to overthrow the international order.” The Kremlin operates within a great-power 
paradigm with the supremacy of hard power and in which maneuver is prioritized over morality.60  
Meanwhile, the major challenge that America seems to be reluctant to consider Russia as 
a country with its own legitimate interests. Currently, this is especially exacerbated by media since 
any attempts to understand Russia’s motives and points of view is not “acceptable to discuss” in 
the mainstream media and those who call for a better understanding of Russia are labeled as “dupes 
of Russian propaganda.” This prevents the objective understanding of Russia in America today.61  
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CHAPTER III 
RUSSIA’S OFFICIAL DISCOURSE AND NARRATIVES: PERCEPTIONS OF THE WORLD 
ORDER AND POST-SOVIET SPACE 
In order to understand Russia’s behavior in the post-Soviet space and the direction of 
Russian policy in the region, it is necessary first to assess Russian narratives of the international 
environment and Russia’s role in it and its national interests within the existing order. This chapter 
examines Russian views of the current world order and its narratives of the post-Soviet space 
expressed in official documents and statements by the Russian political establishment.  
 
Russian Perception of the World Order 
In his speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club’s annual meeting in 2014, 
President Vladimir Putin argued that the U.S.-led unipolar world system threatened Russian 
interests, and he urged the construction of a new world order that will be based on global 
consensus. Putin explained, “Instead of establishing a new balance of power, essential for 
maintaining order and stability, they took steps that threw the system into sharp and deep 
imbalance. The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear 
and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards. This 
created the impression that the so-called ‘victors’ in the Cold War had decided to pressure events 
and reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests.”62 Soon after that speech the documents 
that outline the major national security concerns and the course of Russia’s foreign policy were 
updated and reiterated to reflect the views of Putin at Valdai. President Putin signed a new military 
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doctrine in December 2014, and the new National Security Concept and the new Foreign Policy 
Concept were adopted in December 2015 and November 2016 respectively.  
The National Security Concept (NSC) of 31 December 2015 outlines the world order as 
‘polycentric’ and declares Russia to be one of the ‘centers of influence’ that is increasingly 
involved in the resolution of major international problems and military conflicts and in ensuring 
strategic stability.63 The concept of a polycentric world order was first mentioned in Russia’s 
Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 that articulated a narrative of a multipolar world and the dangers 
of a unipolar system. From the Russian perspective, a US-led unipolar system is viewed as the 
world ruled by one power that implants democracy and human rights around the world and 
interferes in the domestic politics of sovereign states. Moreover, the unipolar world order, through 
restricting the sovereignty of nation-states and establishing supranational unions, such as NATO, 
IMF, World Bank, WTO, Hague Tribunal, Kyoto Protocol, aims to redistribute resources in favor 
of those actors who provide the highest economic efficiency. This brings advantages to only 
several powers and Russia is merely seen as a ‘keeper’ of oil and gas pipelines for those actors.64 
Starting from 2012, the Kremlin shifted its discourse towards prioritizing the ideas of patriotism, 
morality, and traditional values in contrast to globalization. The new official discourse also 
included the idea of Russia’s exceptionalism: Russia as a different and unique civilization and 
morally superior from the West. 
President Putin declared Russia’s new concept of Russian foreign policy in his 2007 
Munich speech: “The unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world 
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[…] The US has overstepped its borders in every way. We must build a new world order to ensure 
security and prosperity for all.”65 From this point of view, the new world order was supposed to be 
a new form of global governance in which Russia would be one of the centers of the new multipolar 
world.  
In order to understand the underlying logic of the Russian perception of the world order, 
one needs to examine the conditions under which that perception was confirmed. This brings us to 
the question of the international environment in which Russia has found itself over the past two 
decades.  
The post-Cold War world was characterized by a US-led international order with American 
global military dominance and the dissemination of democracy and its core values around the 
globe and, on top of that, the increasing presence of NATO troops on Russia’s borders. From 1993 
to 2006, US military expenditures increased from $488 billion to $610 billion and its share of 
overall world military spending rose above 40 percent.66 Along with the increase in military 
expenditures, there was also a shift in US foreign policy doctrine towards the spread of democratic 
values around the world and the right to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states.67 After 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, NATO – that was initially created to provide collective security 
against the Soviet Union – started to significantly expand eastward. Former Soviet allies, such as 
Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary joined the alliance in 1999; Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became NATO member-states in 2004; Croatia and 
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Albania joined in 2009; and Montenegro in 2017. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, NATO 
explicitly stated that Georgia and Ukraine “will become members.”68 In his speeches, President 
Vladimir Putin repeatedly accused NATO of taking advantage of Russian weakness after the end 
of the Cold War to expand the alliance eastward, in violation of promises allegedly made by 
Western leaders in the early 1990s. These so-called “top level assurances” had been made by the 
US and West German leaders during the German reunification process that NATO would not be 
expanded eastward and that a “non-aligned buffer zone between NATO’s eastern border and 
Russia” would be ensured.69 In her article, Kristina Spohr explores whether the West really made 
promises to Soviet leaders in the winter of 1990 to not expand NATO eastward. Using declassified 
materials, she concludes that “no legally binding pledges of any sort were made to Soviet leaders 
by any Western policymaker either in the winter of 1990 or at any later point to foreclose NATO 
membership for Eastern European countries.”70 However, this fact does not deny that during the 
unification negotiations major US and West German political actors – particularly James Baker, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and Helmut Kohl – did make comments to Soviet leaders that they might 
have been perceived as assurances to not expand NATO in Eastern Europe. Such statements 
perhaps tended to correspond with Soviet wishful thinking. In any event, Mikhail Gorbachev and 
Boris Yeltsin never asked that the Baltic states – during the period of reclaiming their 
independence in 1991 – sign away the prospect of joining NATO at some point. The alliance and 
its future was simply not a great concern at that point either to Soviet or to Russian leaders and not 
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to the Baltic countries themselves.71 In the early 1990s, the European Union and NATO were 
considered as the “institutional West” and as organizations whose membership would provide 
economic prosperity and social stability. However, by the late 1990s, as Russia’s “near-abroad” 
rhetoric increased and hostility toward the West began to grow, the Baltic states turned to NATO 
for security. Thus, by referring to so-called “promises” made by Western leaders, Russian officials 
demonstrated not an interest in ascertaining what really happened in 1990 but an attempt to use 
history to legitimize their current political positions.72 
Keith Darden, an Associate Professor at American University’s School of International 
Service, helpfully argues that the current Russian regime is partially the result of the post-Cold 
War international environment or, to put it precisely, of the era of unprecedented American power 
in which post-Soviet Russia was shaped. But just because a country is powerful does not 
necessarily mean that it is threatening. However, Darden makes the point that most countries 
would think powerful states are threatening. And this is the reason why after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, and particularly following the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, Russia has 
been perceiving American power and influence around the world as a “multifaceted Western 
threat.” In response to the US military buildup and NATO expansion, Russia increased its defense 
budget and transformed its military. Internally, Russia also increased the repression of dissent: the 
Kremlin issued restrictive laws towards civil society and NGOs, foreign aid and assistance, the 
media, and the control of strategic economic assets. The government has justified these restrictive 
laws as a need to resist against a Western threat.73 In this sense, “each new crisis in external 
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relations was met with a serial closing of Russia’s doors to the international liberal order.”74 
 
Russia’s perception of threat 
“If the perception of threat derives from a combination of capability and intent,” one would 
find the idea of American power not threatening in the post-Cold War period.75 However, Russia 
inherited the Soviet vision of the world in terms of the balance of power categories and perceived 
NATO expansion, US active support of democracy in other countries, such as “color revolutions,” 
as threatening. From the Russian government’s perspective, the past twenty-five years have been 
an increasing expansion of the threat coming from a predominance of US power: Yugoslavia and 
Iraq; the color revolutions in the post-Soviet countries; the war in South Ossetia; the Arab spring 
in the Middle East; and finally the Euromaidan in Ukraine in 2014.76 Each crisis urged and 
increased Russia’s official narrative about the threat of a powerful and interventionist United 
States. By 2017, the predominant Russian view – expressed in official statements and the federal 
media – sees the United States as the dominating military power that interferes and imposes its 
values in the affairs of sovereign states as well as the leading force of the military alliance that has 
approached the borders of Russia and poses a threat to the national security of the country.  
Sergey Karaganov, a Russian political scientist who heads the Council on Foreign and 
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Defense Policy and a geopolitical strategist for President Putin, claims that the security issue is the 
main driving reason that forces Russia to play one of the leading roles in the world arena: “Our 
whole history is a struggle for survival. Sometimes we drove it in an active mode expanding our 
borders. Sovereignty and defense are our national ideas. This manifested itself in Ukraine when 
Western alliances, including NATO, began expanding on the territory for which Russia and 
Ukraine were paid millions of lives. If NATO included Ukraine in its ranks, this would be an 
absolute military challenge to the war, because 2500 kilometers of the border with Ukraine would 
have been unprotected. Luckily Russia acted the way it did and prevented the inevitable big war 
in Europe.”77 While the West posits Russia as the power that suffered a defeat in the Cold War and 
seeks to subordinate the post-Soviet space, the majority of Russians claim that the West by its 
policy in the post-Soviet space drove Russia “into a corner” and thus Russia was forced to react.  
The majority of Russians believe that they live in a state surrounded by enemies. According 
to the Levada Center, an independent Russian public opinion pollster, 66 percent of Russians 
believe that Russia has enemies as opposed to the 2014 polls in which 84 percent of respondents 
agreed on this. 56 percent of Russians named the United States as the main enemy of Russia while 
29 percent of respondents called Ukraine, and 14 percent – the European Union.78 Surprisingly, 
NATO was not perceived as one of the main threats. The reason for this is the majority of Russians 
perceive NATO to be an American organization. The perception of the US as an enemy, on the 
one hand, has remained from the Soviet era. On the other hand, this perception was, to a large 
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extent, caused by American military campaigns around the world. According to the vice-president 
of the Center for Political Technologies Alexei Makarkin, the perception of the US as an enemy 
increases Russians’ self-esteem: “If the world power is considered as an enemy, it means that your 
own country is powerful and significant. It means that Russia is on the same level with the United 
States. The enemy in the form of, for example, Estonia or Lithuania, deprives any prestige because 
you put your country with them on the same level. Having an enemy like the US is in its own way 
prestigious.”79  
 The Russian perception of having enemies has numerous causes, notes Alexei Makarkin. 
He explains that such perception dominated during the Soviet period and continues to this day. It 
is also associated with a sense of instability caused by a number of events, such as the war in 
Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya, and the Arab Spring. This is connected with fears that something like 
this can happen in Russia. In addition, Makarkin gives another important factor – the sense of so-
called self-righteousness and conviction that Russians are right about everything, they have never 
been aggressors and never started wars first. And if from the Western point of view, Russians were 
doing something wrong or illegal, they (i.e. Russians) were still right. Therefore, those who do not 
agree with the Russian point of view, either do not understand them or they are enemies. Russians 
are convinced that the West understands their position and they are determined to harm them.80 
Thus, Russians believe that they are surrounded by enemies. 
Russia’s National Security Concept of 2015 defines threats to national security as “the set 
of conditions and factors creating a direct or indirect possibility of harm to national interests.” The 
document indicates the further expansion of NATO and the creation of US biological laboratories 
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in the territories of Russia’s neighboring states as a threat to national security.81 In the previous 
documents, NATO and the United States were not defined as threats. The critical shift in Russian 
perceptions of the threat came with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 when the alliance 
showed that they could and would intervene in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state without 
United Nations approval.82 Soon after that, Russia’s National Security Concept issued in 1999 
identified international influence in Russia’s internal politics as a threat to national security.83 An 
expansion of the state control within society was expressed as strategically necessary to prevent 
external forces from undermining Russia’s internal security. In 2012, the State Duma passed a 
“foreign agents” law according to which NGOs that receive foreign funding should register as 
“foreign agents.” In December 2017, in response to the US decision to register the Russian 
television channel Russia Today as a “foreign agent,” the State Duma passed a law that allows 
foreign media outlets in Russia to be listed as “foreign agents.” Under this law, the Ministry of 
Justice determines the list of media sources that will be registered as “foreign agents.” 
With the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russian security doctrines disclosed another turn 
in Russian perceptions of the US interference in internal affairs. The “color revolutions” were 
perceived with harsh criticism by the Russian political establishment. Russia accused the West of 
inciting tensions and anti-Russian sentiments in the post-Soviet area. In particular, US and EU 
support for “anti-constitutional coup d’etat in Ukraine led to a deep split in Ukrainian society […] 
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and the deliberate shaping in the Ukrainian population of an image of Russia as an enemy.” By 
May 2014, the Russian security doctrine identified color revolutions as a form of hybrid warfare 
used by the United States as the primary external threat.84 
In his speech at the Valdai Club annual meeting in October 2017, President Putin again 
accused the United States of interfering in the affairs of sovereign states: “Unfortunately, after 
dividing up the geopolitical heritage of the Soviet Union, our Western partners became convinced 
of the justness of their cause and declared themselves the victors of the Cold War and started 
openly interfering in the affairs of sovereign states, and exporting democracy just like the Soviet 
leadership had tried to export the socialist revolution to the rest of the world in its time.”85  
Interestingly, in their speeches, both President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov criticized the United States, not the West in general. The reason for this attitude is most 
likely that Europe seems to be a victim, as the Soviets would say, of “American hegemonism.” 
From the Russian point of view, the EU, unlike Russia, finds in itself neither political nor economic 
courage to withstand the American power. The Russian political elite as well as the majority of 
Russians associate NATO with the United States and perceive the alliance as a US instrument of 
power projection. 
In January 2018, the Federal Security Service published a presidential decree on state 
border policy. The document declares that Russia’s neighboring states are posing a threat; 
however, the document does not indicate which countries. The document also stresses that Russia 
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has no territorial claims to other countries and that the leading world powers are trying to force 
Russia out of the zone that Moscow considers an object of its strategic interests. Among other risks 
the document mentions a host of other problems: the presence of military and socio-political 
tensions near the borders of Russia; conditions likely to destabilize the socio-political situation in 
the border area of the Russian Federation on the basis of the unresolved socio-economic problems; 
and finally, religious and ethnic contradictions and separatist manifestations among the population 
of the border area of the Russian Federation.86 
President Putin repeatedly stated that the rapprochement between Ukraine and NATO 
poses a threat to Russia’s security: “Nowadays, NATO is a mere instrument of foreign policy for 
the US. It has no allies, it has only vassals. Once a country becomes a NATO member, it is hard 
to resist the pressure of the US, a major country, and NATO leader. And all of a sudden any weapon 
system can be placed in this country – an anti-ballistic missile system, new military bases and if 
need be new offensive systems.”87 Putin believes that the expansion of NATO is actually aimed at 
deterring Russia which the alliance sees as the main threat.88  
 
Russia as a Great Power 
Russia has been consistently characterizing itself as a great power.89 In particular, both the 
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current National Security Concept and the Foreign Policy Concept emphasize Russia’s status as 
one of the leading world powers whose sovereignty must be respected and whose foreign policy 
depends on its national interests. The vision of Russia as a great power involves Russia’s desire to 
participate in deciding international disputes, to have an influence in its region, to cooperate with 
the leading countries on an equal basis, and to have its autonomy and sovereignty respected. As 
Dmitry Trenin, the Director of Moscow Carnegie Center, notes, Russia grievances against the 
West falls in two narratives: that the West fails to recognize Russia’s contribution towards ending 
the Cold War, and that the West does not acknowledge Russia’s Great Power status.90 
According to the experts from the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russian foreign 
policy is still in the process of its self-identification which includes a return to traditional values, 
the main principles of foreign policy, and politics in general. By the main principles of foreign 
policy, they imply the unconditional provision of sovereignty and security of Russia and its status 
of the great power. Russia’s great power status, they write, derive from “the reforms of Peter the 
Great and Catherine the Great and the victories of the XVIII and XIX centuries.” The attempt to 
abandon those principles in the late 1980s and in the 1990s led to nothing but loss and rejection 
by the majority of the Russian people, according to them.91 
The idea of multipolarity, which was stated as one of five key principles of Russian foreign 
policy by then-President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008, implies the presence of several leading 
powers, one of which is Russia. Russia also seeks to be one of the major participants in resolving 
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international conflicts. In September 2015, Russia launched airstrikes in Syria, marking the 
beginning of a significant military intervention. This was its first use of military force outside the 
former Soviet Union since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. By providing direct air support for 
Syria’s military operations in 2015, Russia helped Bashar al-Assad maintain his regime, reinforced 
its military presence, and participated in negotiations in support of a ceasefire. In resolving the 
situation in the East of Ukraine, Russia has preferred discussions in the Normandy Format along 
with Germany, France, and Ukraine, which may be desirable since it emphasizes the importance 
of Russia’s role and excludes the United States. Russia is also a member of the BRICS association 
of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; as well 
as other regional forums that underline Russia’s autonomy and international role.  
Elena Chebankova, a British political scientist specializing in the political process in 
modern Russia, distinguishes three notions central to contemporary discourse in Russia. First, the 
idea of state sovereignty, she assures, viewed as the capacity for political development free from 
external influence, has become the principal unifying factor in Russia. Second, the idea of national 
reconciliation in Russia, or the idea that contemporary Russia is a direct heir to the Soviet Union 
and that most achievements in the post-Soviet period stem from Soviet times, including matters of 
culture and even the “collective unconscious.” And, finally, Russian discourse frequently 
emphasizes the importance of a multipolar world and the state’s entitlement to independent 
development, a contrast to the Euro-Atlantic universalist approach of globalist democratization.92  
 
 
                                                
92 Elena Chebankova, “Ideas, Ideology & Intellectuals in Search of Russia’s Political Future,” 
Daedelus 146, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 80-82. 
 39 
Post-Soviet space 
The Russian political establishment has consistently expressed Russia’s interest in 
maintaining close relations with and influence within Russia’s neighboring countries. Indeed, in 
the hierarchy of Russian foreign policy, post-Soviet space, or, as Russians used to say in the 1990s, 
the “near abroad,” remains a key foreign policy priority.93 This is evident in the 2013 and 2016 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Concept Papers. In both versions, the post-
Soviet space occupies the first place in the list of “Regional Priorities,” demonstrating its highest 
priority in the Kremlin’s agenda.94 However, the scope of Russia’s policy in the area is not well 
defined and remains vague. The Concept puts in the first place the development of “bilateral and 
multicultural cooperation with member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia” and the further strengthening of 
“integration structures within the CIS involving Russia.”95 Specifically, Russia advocates the 
development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a security alliance of the 
post-Soviet countries – and its “conversion into a universal international organization capable of 
confronting regional challenges and military-political and military-strategic threats.”96 In terms of 
economic integration, the Conception sees the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which was 
established in 2014 under the auspices of Russia and includes, at this point, Armenia, Belarus, 
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, as a form of integration within the Eurasian space. The 
Concept advocates for “the consolidation of the Union for the continued integration, stable 
development, cooperation and enhanced competitiveness of the economies of the Union’s 
members within the global economy.”97 In other words, this integration process involves political, 
economic, and military components in the form of unions of states or international organizations 
that serve as a tool of maintaining Russia’s pre-eminence and influence in the post-Soviet space. 
In his speeches, Putin consistently describes Russia’s relations with former Soviet 
countries as a “brotherly relationship” with “fraternal peoples.” In particular, the vision of Russians 
and Ukrainians as “one people” still prevails in Russia. The phrase “brotherly relationship” 
actually referred to the Soviet “friendship of the peoples” rhetoric, the approach that was adopted 
to strengthen the unity of multiethnic republics of the Soviet Union in which all peoples were 
equal, but the Russian nation was “first among equals.”98 The phrase first appeared in a Pravda 
front-page editorial in 1936: “All the peoples [of the USSR], participants in the great socialist 
construction project, can take pride in the results of their work. All of them from the smallest to 
the largest are equal Soviet patriots. But the first among equals is the Russian people, the Russian 
workers, the Russian toilers, whose role in the entire Great Proletarian Revolution, from the first 
victory to today’s brilliant period of its development, has been exclusively great.”99  
Though all ethnic groups in Russia were equal, the Russian language and people were the 
“first among equals.” The Russian language was promoted as the greatest of all the languages of 
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the Soviet Union and was used as the main one all over the USSR. All Soviet citizens, however, 
were aware of their ethnicity, which in the case of suspicious ethnic groups – in particular, Jewish, 
Germans, Poles – meant official discrimination or persecution. In some cases, these ethnic groups 
became the targets of popular ethnic hostility.100 The Soviet Union had once proclaimed itself to 
be the “world’s first multiethnic anti-imperial state”, but its practices were imperial.101 
As an American-Russian journalist Masha Gessen points out, “Twelve years after the end 
of the USSR, Russia still perceived its former subjects as part of itself. Unlike clearly distinct 
foreign countries, former Soviet republics were referred to as the ‘near abroad’ (Helsinki and 
Vienna are closer to Moscow than Kiev and Tbilisi, but the designation referred to psychic and 
political rather than physical distance).”102 In this sense, Russian perception of former Soviet space 
as part of itself still prevailing in Russian society is psychic in nature and most likely will continue 
to retain for a long time. 
The psychic perception is connected to and closely interacts with the political perception 
of the near abroad as part of Russia. RAND Corporation experts offer the mapping of Russia’s 
desired influence, with Russia, Belarus, Central Asia, and Ukraine at the center and diminishing 
influence in the Caucasus, the Baltic states, and then the Western Balkans and countries of the 
former Warsaw Pact.103 
As the experts note, the desire for regional influence runs deeper than strategic concerns 
about maintaining buffer zones from foreign invasion. Russian and Western experts refer to a 
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longstanding “imperial” identity, tracing back from Russia’s expansion in the XVI through XIX 
centuries and the record of the Soviet Union.104 Igor Zevelev, former director of the MacArthur 
Foundation’s Russia office, writes that Russian identity comprises the “’Little Russians’ 
(Ukrainians), the ‘White Russians’ (Belorussians), and the ‘Great Russians’ (ethnic Russians).”105 
Russian identity is also composed of the other post-Soviet states, including countries in Central 
Asia, based on their shared past and use of the Russian language.106 Russia’s cultural connection 
and leadership over its region are currently defined as Russkiy Mir, or Russian World, meaning 
support for Russia’s “compatriots.”107 
From the Russian perspective, as Dmitry Trenin writes, “the new states are not yet quite 
states. Interestingly, Moscow’s political relations with them are still managed by the Kremlin chief 
of staff, rather than the foreign minister. For many in the new states, the CIS is a holdover from 
the imperial era, a club in which they are less equal than the former hegemon.”108 Following this 
point, a survey held by RAND Corporation shows the types of Russia’s influence in the former 
Soviet countries. They reveal that post-Soviet states do not make any significant foreign and 
security decisions without consulting Russia; Moscow requires that when it “picks up the phone,” 
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leaders follow through on Russia’s requests. Major organizations in the region, including the 
CSTO, CIS, and numerous Russian nongovernmental organizations, have direct links to and are 
backed by the Kremlin.109 
Over the past two decades, Russia has been consistent in its narratives about the 
international order as well as Russia’s role in it. Russian leaders and experts see the current 
international order as led by the United States and perceive it as a threat to Russian national 
interests and security. Russia identifies itself as a great power (along with the US and China) in 
the growing multipolar international system and, hence, wants the international community, 
particularly the United States, to respect its autonomy and sovereignty, cooperate on an equal basis, 
and take into account Russian interests. 
Misunderstandings between the United States and Russia that accumulated after the end of 
the Cold War lie in the lack of a common vision of security in the territory between Russia and the 
Euro-Atlantic community. Russia – which identifies itself as the direct heir of the Soviet Union – 
comes from the Westphalian model in which each nation-state has exclusive sovereignty over its 
territory. While Russia recognizes the fact that its neighboring countries are independent, Russia 
considers itself as the historically superior power in the post-Soviet space. This is a matter highly 
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CHAPTER IV 
RUSSIAN EXPERT COMMUNITY DEBATES ON POST-SOVIET SPACE 
A quarter of a century has passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, yet the character 
of Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space remains vague. There is no declared agreement on what 
is legitimate in relations between Russia and other former Soviet states on the limits of exercising 
their sovereignty.110 For Russia, the post-Soviet space, also known as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries and the Baltic states or ‘near abroad,’ is a region of vital 
interests that has been repeatedly emphasized by the Russian political elite, and the interaction 
with the CIS is Russia’s foreign policy priority. 
The post-Soviet ‘space’ continues to remain as a politically indefinite area, with questions 
over whether this region exists as an established region.111 This question is fundamental for the 
entire study concerning post-Soviet issues. It is not clear how to define this area of the world since 
the very inclusion of the prefix ‘post’ implies the past, already non-existent unit at the present time. 
Besides, the area has already broken up into smaller regions: “West” or New Eastern Europe, with 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova; South Caucasus; Central Asia; and a Russia standing alone. 
The USSR disappeared several decades ago, but Russian academia and policymakers 
continue to refer to it by using such terms as “post-Soviet,” “post-Socialist,” “former Soviet 
republics,” or the term widely used in the 1990s, “near abroad” as opposed to “far abroad.” These 
terms defined the area of the former Soviet republics within the foreign political orbit of Russia. 
In particular, Dmitry Trenin notes that the term ‘near abroad’ did not imply “temporary nature” of 
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the newly established states’ independence as the West perceived it to be, it implied “the change 
of attitude to them as truly sovereign states but not as outlying republics of the once single 
country.”112  
To this day, the post-Soviet ‘space’ has still not established its own, conceptual identity, 
most often hiding behind the prefix ‘post.’113 In Russia, the notion postsovetskoye prostranstvo 
(i.e. post-Soviet space) is actively used as the reference to this space from the past. Though the 
post-Soviet space as a political unit does not exist anymore, the notion of post-Soviet space endures 
and remains psychological in nature: it exists in the minds of politicians and the public, but not in 
reality. In other words, one can say that the post-Soviet space represents not a political unit, but a 
geographic and cultural concept. The term ‘post-Soviet space’ has become simply a convenient 
definition of the region with fifteen former Soviet republics as well as those states that have been 
established over the past twenty-five years.  
In this chapter, I use the definition of ‘post-Soviet space’ mainly because this notion is 
actively used in the official documents and statements of the Russian political leadership as well 
as in the research of Russia foreign policy analysts whose work I am researching here. This chapter 
focuses on current debates prevailing in the Russian expert community regarding Russia’s policy 
in post-Soviet space. Though the Russian leaders and foreign policy experts’ views are mostly 
consistent in general, the expert community has distinctive ideas from the political establishment 
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regarding particular issues. Drawing from existing work on Russian foreign policy expertise, I 
identified three major interests that underlie Russian thinking, policy, and behavior nowadays:  
o The crisis over Ukraine and the concept of the “Russian World.” 
o NATO enlargement. 
o Eurasian integration and promoting regional economic and security cooperation through 
new regional organizations under Russian leadership, such as the Eurasian Economic 
Union and the Collective Security Treatment Organization. 
 
Ukraine and the concept of the Russian World 
Although Ukraine gained its independence and sovereignty after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, Russia had been continuing to consider Ukraine as part of itself and certainly not foreign 
to Russia. As Dmitry Trenin notes, “In fact, Ukraine was seen by many as part of the core of 
historical Russia, and its independence, as a transitory state.”114 Indeed, delineated in 1997, borders 
between Russia and Ukraine were seen by the majority of Russians as a formality. According to 
the Levada Center polls held in 2001, 65 percent of Russians refused to consider Ukraine as a 
foreign country. By October 2013, this attitude had not changed significantly – 61% of Russians 
still refused to see Ukraine as a foreign country.115  
Addressing the Russian audience and arguing with such attitudes, the second president of 
Ukraine Leonid Kuchma titled his book Ukraine Is Not Russia, on the cover of which “not” was 
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highlighted in red.116 Highlighting the differences between Ukrainian and Russian national 
characters, different views on the cultural and historical past, Kuchma sets out to explain why 
Ukraine cannot be Russia.117 The book was met with harsh criticism both in Russia and Ukraine. 
In his review, Russian political scientist Sergey Markedonov noted that Ukrainian politicians are 
“guided, first of all, by what distinguishes and divides us [Russians and Ukrainians]. They do 
everything to make these differences as much as possible.”118 Though his note was discerning, the 
Russian political establishment did not take seriously the moods prevailing among the Ukrainian 
elite. 
The first major failure of Russian policy in Ukraine came with the “Orange Revolution” in 
2004-2005. Moscow saw in the revolution the result of external interference with “far-reaching 
geopolitical goals.” From the Kremlin point of view, the “Orange Revolution” was an attempt to 
displace Russia from its key position in the post-Soviet space and to “test” the scenario of a similar 
“street” coup in Moscow.119 In Russia, the Orange Revolution was presented as an event that was 
largely initiated and actively manipulated by the West. Quickly, however, the contradictions which 
soon began among the “orange” activists blunted the fears of the spread of color revolutions in 
Russia.120 
Kremlin’s other anxiety was followed by Kyiv’s request to provide Ukraine with a plan for 
preparing for NATO membership in 2008 that was backed by the United States. President Vladimir 
Putin took the unprecedented step of traveling to Bucharest for the NATO summit in order to 
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convince the alliance of the potential danger of turmoil in Ukraine and the split of the country if 
Kyiv moved towards the NATO alliance. As Trenin notes, Moscow drew a “red line,” warning 
NATO and Kyiv of the danger of a conflict with Russia in case Ukraine decided to join the alliance. 
The following war in South Ossetia in 2008 confirmed the seriousness of Moscow’s intentions 
and, as a result, the talks about Ukraine and Georgia’s possible accession into NATO were “put 
on hold.” 
The Euromaidan – a wave of mass demonstrations in Ukraine which began in November 
2013 with very large protests demanding closer European integration – was very negatively 
perceived by the Russian elite and society. The events in Ukraine have been presented again as “a 
dress rehearsal of what is planned to be done in Russia,” as a coup supported and organized by the 
United States in order to destabilize Russia.121 Russian society, which was tired of social and 
political instability caused by the radical transformation in the 1990s, perceived the possibility of 
repeating those events as something especially negative.  
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is considered as a “fratricidal” conflict which Russia could 
not prevent. According to Russian expert Fyodor Lukyanov, the incapacity of the Ukrainian elites, 
along with the Western policy to expand its zone of influence and to prevent the rapprochement of 
Ukraine and Russia, are at the heart of this conflict. However, he notes that Russian policy is also 
responsible for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. For almost twenty-five years, there was no long-
term policy towards Ukraine. When it came to Russian interests in Ukraine, Russia would “buy” 
the Kyiv elite with profitable long-term contracts and discounts in the price of natural gas for 
Ukraine. The belief in the “brotherhood” of the two nations, which supposedly had to inevitably 
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become one nation, remained in the minds of the Russian political elite. But the price of that 
“return” had never been taken into account by the Kremlin. The result is a war in Ukraine and its 
further “degradation towards either an ultranationalist dictatorship or, more likely, further 
disintegration.”122   
Dmitry Trenin also sees the main reason for the Russian failure in Ukraine to be a product 
of its ignoring the fact, which is unpleasant for many Russians, that the Ukrainian elite is imbued 
with the spirit of “nativism” – a dream of an independent Ukrainian political project, different and 
separate from the Russian one. He argues that, in practice, such a project cannot be realized even 
within the framework of the economic rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia, not to mention 
the full-scale integration of the two countries. It is also clear that the great attraction of Russia, the 
Russian language, and Russian culture makes it difficult to establish a Ukrainian-speaking political 
nation. The Ukrainian political project can only be successful in the isolation of Ukraine from 
Russia to a maximum extent.123  
In Russia, Ukrainian nationalism has been perceived as a deeply negative phenomenon. 
The vision of Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” still prevails in Russian society. This was 
also repeatedly stated by President Putin: “The development of the Slavic world was complicated. 
Russia’s development was also difficult. It was formed by many Slavic tribes – 16 or 32. 
Eventually, ancient Rus emerged, and Kyiv became part of it and the center of it. In this sense, our 
historical, spiritual and other roots entitle me to say that basically, we are one and the same people. 
But, of course, you may not agree with me. One more thing is clear. Being close to Russia’s 
western border, Ukraine developed accordingly and has many wonderful unique features in its 
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language and culture – in everything. They are all cherished in Russia and considered to be part of 
our own culture.”124 Thus, historical roots suggest that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” 
and, therefore, the Ukrainian nationalists, who encroach on the unity of the “brotherly people,” 
appear to be enemies not only of Russians but also of Ukrainians.125 
The problem, however, is that the Ukrainian elite leaned toward the side of the Ukrainian 
nationalists long before the Euromaidan. The Ukrainian elite has been positioning itself as “real” 
Ukrainians, not “Malorossians” (Little Russians) – younger brothers of the Russians – and this 
vision particularly has become prevalent among Ukrainian people after Russia’s actions in the 
Euromaidan, Crimea, and Donbass. However, the Russian establishment has not fully realized it 
yet. The Kremlin still focuses on what unifies all East Slavic people, on common faith and common 
history, and gives little attention to their differences.126 
The focus on common historical and cultural roots is at the heart of the concept of the 
“Russian World,” the cultural and historical idea of the international community united by its 
involvement in Russia and adherence to the Russian language and culture. Marlene Laurelle 
describes the idea of the “Russian World” as a “geopolitical imagination, a fuzzy mental atlas on 
which different regions of the world and their different links to Russia can be articulated in a fluid 
way.”127 The Russian World is not based on Russian ethnicity but encompasses the Soviet legacy 
and the Russian-speaking communities inside and outside the country’s borders in which Russian 
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language and culture represent a “cultural export.”128 But despite the prevailing cultural basis, the 
concept is also applied to justify Russia’s “post-colonial” policies in the so-called “near abroad” 
and to cover up interference in the internal affairs of other states. In particular, President Putin 
justified the annexation of Crimea in 2014 not only as the return of Russia’s historical territory 
that was “illegitimately” added to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for bureaucratic reasons 
in 1954 but as the reunification of the “Russian World.” Indeed, by 2014, 65 percent of the whole 
population of Crimea were ethnic Russians.  
The concept of the Russian World is not new, but its modern emergence dates to the early 
twenty-first century as a response to the impact of globalization on the development and culture 
of Russia. Many Russian thinkers view globalization in a negative light, expressing their concern 
over Russia’s loss of power and threat to its cultural values. However, the main idea was not in 
favor of the international isolation of Russia, but in the need for a type of mini-globalization within 
the Russian community. In this respect, the idea of integration within the CIS began to be 
emphasized since the early 2000s and was repeatedly stated as Russia’s foreign policy priority. 
According to the concept of the Russian World, Russia should find a way of interaction with the 
outside world that will allow it to preserve traditional values and will also provide economic 
benefit from the processes of globalization. In the concept of the Eurasian Union, which became 
the backbone of the foreign policy agenda of Vladimir Putin's presidential program in 2011, 
Ukraine took up an important place as a part of the Eurasian integration project. The success of 
the integration largely depended on the economic and political orientation of Kyiv. Without 
Ukraine, this would be just limited integration composed of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as 
the main actors. 
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Thus, Russia justifies its actions in Ukraine, to a large extent, by the idea of the Russian 
world. Russia as the older brother comes to help its little brother to prevent it from choosing a 
wrong way, from the loss of belonging to the Russian world. 
Dmitry Trenin explains Ukraine’s distancing from Russia as a consequence of the process 
of the formation of the Ukrainian nation as an independent and separate unit and not the result of 
internal conspiracy or intrigues of external forces. This process did not necessarily have to take 
the form of violent actions, but in any case, it would lead to the isolation of Ukraine from Russia.129 
Despite the fact that the Ukrainian issue has been taking one of the main places in Russia's 
foreign policy agenda, the conflict has reached its point in which Moscow finds it necessary to 
abstract itself from the conflict as much as possible. Fyodor Lukyanov writes that Ukraine will 
most likely continue to degrade and he finds it important to limit the negative and distracting 
influence of the Ukrainian factor on Russian politics. The program minimum, that aimed to stop 
the further expansion of Western alliances to Ukraine and to other countries that Russia considers 
vitally important in terms of its security, has been completed. In the coming years, Lukyanov 
emphasizes that it is important to “comply with the Minsk agreements and to abstract from Ukraine 
as much as possible.” According to the Russian expert, the problem of Donbass currently seems 
unsolvable. For Russia, it is better to have a semi-independent, but formally Ukrainian territory 
assisted by Russia. In other words, the conflict should remain as a “frozen” conflict.130  
Ukraine for many years will remain an issue perplexing Russia’s constructive relations 
with Europe, a “source of ‘black swans’ – unpredictable challenges and provocations.”131 
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Lukyanov concludes that distraction of Russia and partly other European countries from a more 
productive policy, apparently, was “one of the motives of the efforts of the forces that contributed 
to the fueling of the crisis.”132  
The conflict in Ukraine demonstrated that Russia needs to closely observe, study and try 
to understand Ukraine as well as other neighboring countries. Talking about brotherhood and unity, 
Russia “paid a great price for ignoring the real Ukraine.”133 
 
NATO enlargement 
The main threats to Russia’s security are formulated in the latest version of Russia’s Military 
Doctrine of December 2014. According to the doctrine, NATO enlargement is the most serious 
military danger that Russia faces. For many years, Russian leaders viewed the possibility of 
expanding NATO at the expense of the former Soviet republics as a threat.134 To some extent, 
Russia’s concerns about the plans of Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance led to Russia’s 
involvement in the conflicts in both countries. Although this remains the main concern for the 
Russian leadership, in recent years it has also begun to pay special attention to the expansion of 
NATO’s military infrastructure in the countries of the alliance located at the borders of the Russian 
Federation. From the Russian point of view, NATO is attempting to penetrate into the central 
regions of Eurasia to balance against Russia. After the demise of the Soviet Union, there was no 
document or a peace treaty that would regulate the situation in Europe. As a result, the region saw 
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the emergence of a political vacuum tending to destabilization. Europe has not become a space of 
indivisible security and cooperation because the West desires to extend the zone of influence and 
control over the territories that Moscow considers as a vital zone of its national interests as well as 
the West’s unwillingness to take into account Russia’s interests and concerns.135  
In his speech to the Russian parliament on March 18, 2014, President Putin legitimized the 
annexation of Crimea, stressing at the same time what humiliation Russia suffered because of the 
West’s unwillingness to keep its promises not to expand NATO beyond the borders of reunited 
Germany. For more than twenty years, the story of the alleged “broken promise” has become an 
integral part of Russia’s post-Soviet self-identity. Constantly remembering the past is still the most 
convenient way of distracting attention from the present. 
Due to its geostrategic importance for Russia’s security, the Baltic region was, is and will 
remain in the forefront of Russian foreign policy in the foreseeable future. For the Baltic States 
and Poland, Russia is part of the “black legend” of the national myth.136 The anti-Russian element 
in East European politics gradually declined after the end of the Cold War. However, the Georgian, 
and then the Ukrainian crises gave it a qualitatively new character. The autocratic nature of Russia, 
thus, gives rise to an expansionist and aggressive foreign policy. The Russian threat (after Ukraine) 
has become a powerful factor in the consolidation of the Alliance. 
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Despite the presence of some encouraging trends in the cooperation of NATO and the CIS 
member states, the uncertainty about the new structure of European security inevitably becomes a 
problem that causes additional fears and suspicions of Russian decision-makers.137 
 
Eurasian integration 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia recognized the new states within the borders 
of the Union republics despite the fact that about 25 million ethnic Russians inhabited the 
territories of newly established states. The issues of Ukraine, the Crimean Peninsula, Sevastopol, 
and the Black Sea Navy were not fully resolved. The Russian political establishment refrained 
from making claims on Ukraine in order to avoid a conflict with the state still possessing that part 
of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. 
In the 1990s, the newly established Russian Federation mainly focused on resolving 
domestic issues and fostering relations with the West. It was crucial for Russia to be recognized 
as the legitimate successor to the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, to preserve the seat in the 
UN Security Council and to maintain control over the USSR’s nuclear capability.138 
The Commonwealth of Independents States (CIS) created after the dissolution of the 
USSR, according to Dmitry Trenin, from the very beginning “did not become a platform for the 
re-integration of newly independent states with the former mother country.” Instead, it became the 
tool of joint withdrawal from the imperial state, and a factor in the creation of new states and the 
                                                
137 Vladimir Lukin, “Trudnosti nashei bezopasnosti,” Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 
September 19. 2017, http://svop.ru/main/24754/ (accessed January 16, 2018). 
138 Dmitry Trenin, “Russia and CIS countries: the relations getting mature,” Russian Council of 
International Affairs, March 2, 2012, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-
comments/analytics/russia-and-cis-countries-the-relations-getting-mature/ (accessed February 2, 
2018). 
 56 
strengthening of their independence. The format of the CIS that was based on the equal cooperation 
and that was agreed by Russia, in fact, helped the new states become independent.139 
The military alliance – the Collective Security Treaty Organization – established in May 
1992 by six CIS member states (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan)140 represents one of the tools of integration in the CIS. The CSTO was created to 
protect the territorial and economic space of the treaty member-states from any external military 
and political aggressors, terrorists, and large-scale natural disasters. Moscow considers CSTO as 
an important tool for ensuring national and regional security and for strengthening relations with 
the CIS countries. However, due to the organization’s goal, the possibilities of the CSTO as an 
instrument of Russian foreign policy are limited. Russia has been facing constantly growing 
competition from other states, and international organizations that have their own interests in the 
region (i.e. the US, NATO, and China). 
For a long time, Russia did not have a specific strategy towards the CIS countries, and the 
majority of official statements about Russian policy towards the post-Soviet space were mostly 
declarative. However, in the second decade of the 2000s, Russia began to pursue a more pragmatic 
policy towards its neighboring countries, promoting the expansion of Russian capital and 
projecting political influence in the region that was to a large extent motivated by the goal of the 
internal development of Russia itself. As Dmitry Trenin points out, “the imperial idea was replaced 
by the concept of Russia as a great power.”141 Thus, while the imperial approach of both the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was concerned with the support of the outlying regions 
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rather than itself, a great power focuses on strengthening its own status and needs.142 In his book, 
Post-Imperium: the Eurasian history, Trenin examines the Eurasian integration project from the 
perspective of Russia’s interest. According to him, for post-imperial Russia, the role of the “donor” 
for its former areas is no longer reasonable.143 Therefore, Russia’s Eurasian strategy is based on 
pragmatic solutions.144 
Russia’s turn to the East was repeatedly proclaimed in the early 2000s: one of the first 
official statements regarding Russia’s Eurasian domain priority manifested itself in Putin’s speech 
at the APEC Business Summit in Shanghai in which the president pinpointed Russia as a “Eurasian 
country.”145 From then on, Putin’s statements and official foreign policy documents assert Russia 
as a Eurasian country. However, Russia’s turn to the Eurasian direction started only in 2011-2012 
with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) that will be discussed further.  
As a number of Russian experts from the Valdai Discussion Club note, over the past few 
years, the geostrategic orientation of the Russian ruling elite has significantly changed. Over the 
past 300 years, despite the continued territorial expansion to the East, Russia’s elite considered 
Russia to be the periphery of Europe. In Europe, in turn, such an aspiration was favorably met and 
often led to economic and political concessions to Russia, including the failed effect to teach the 
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late Soviet and early Russia elite how to build a new country according to the proposed rules from 
the West.146  
According to these writers, Russia started to change its attitude towards Europe because of 
“post-European” values and the Brussels (as well as Berlin) “democratic messianism” that began 
to intensify since the late 2000s in parallel with the growing problems within the EU. But the key 
reason of the decrease in the desire of the Russian elites to become a European country, as the 
authors note, was the expansion of Western alliances on the territory that Russia considered vital 
in terms of ensuring its security “for which the peoples of the Russian Empire and the USSR laid 
millions of lives.” This policy led to the failure of the project to create a stable system of European 
security, a common European home and European unity.147  
Thus, from a pro-European one, Russia has started to identify itself as a central Eurasian, 
or a northern Eurasian power. In Russian modern geopolitical thinking, Eurasia includes both the 
post-Soviet space and new segments of the region outside the former Soviet boundaries.148 In 
comparison with Slavophiles, Soviet, and Russian Eurasianists, the new Russian self-identification 
as a “Eurasian nation” means liberation (emancipation) from moral and political dependence on 
the West. At the same time this concept is not anti-European; instead, it tries to be more inclusive 
and implies that the countries that did not share a Soviet identity in their past, but which are 
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interested in economic relations with the region, are welcome in the process of the Eurasian 
integration.149 
Russia’s turn to the East has a strongly marked economic character and its primary task is 
the internal development of Russia itself through attracting investors and opening the market to 
Asian states. Based on this idea as well as relying on the first results of its economic and political 
turn to the East, Russia went further and proposed the formation of a new community – the 
partnership of Greater Eurasia – that was officially supported by the leadership of both Russia and 
China. First of all, this partnership represents a joint economic zone that will include countries that 
are willing to cooperate with the region. On the other hand, the partnership is aimed at an 
economic, political, cultural revival of backward Eurasian countries or, in other words, the goal is 
to transform Eurasia into the center of the world economy and politics. It is supposed to include 
both the countries of Eastern, Southeast and South Asia, the center of Eurasia, and the growing 
extent of the countries of the European subcontinent and their organization insofar as they are 
willing to cooperate. Experts emphasize that the Greater Eurasia project is nothing more than an 
attempt to find new sources of Russia’s economic growth. Russia sees its economic development 
in potential access to Asian markets and increasing trade with the EEU countries, as well as in 
attracting investments in infrastructure projects in Siberia and the Far East.150 
Despite the fact that such structures as the CIS and CSTO were created after the demise of 
the USSR, many of them lacked, and continue to lack the great scale of integration component. At 
this point, the EEU is the most important and active tool of Eurasian integration. The project of 
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setting up the EEU has displayed one of the most significant integrational initiatives by Russia 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Besides, the development of integration processes as the 
most important direction of Russian foreign policy has been highlighted in the past two Russia’s 
Foreign Policy Concepts.  
As Russian experts believe, the EEU plays an important role in Russia’s desire to expand 
the domestic market and, in particular, in its striving to ensure socio-economic and political 
stability in the post-Soviet space. Russia initiated the creation of the EEU based on the conviction 
(which became even more entrenched after 2008) that globalization is gradually becoming 
obsolete. Thus, the Russian establishment accelerated its project of the creation of a more or less 
powerful regional development center in Eurasia.151 
Though the idea of the Eurasian integration project was suggested in 1994 by the President 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev,152 Russia is considered to be the most 
interested force within the EEU. According to the most widespread version of Russia’s incentives, 
the interest of Russia in the creation and the development of the EEU is based on its strategic 
interests of expanding the economic and political space around its borders to secure the status of a 
superpower and to gain economic dominance in the region. Scholars and analysts have described 
the EEU initiative as an “essentially political project” aimed at regional integration. However, this 
version does not have a broad analytical evidence base in terms of economic effects for the Russian 
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economy. The research in this area is filled with analytical materials on the impact of the EEU for 
all members of the organization in which Russia is primarily given the role of a donor. By tacit 
consent, it is considered that the impact of the unified economic zone within the EEU on the 
Russian economy is either positive or not significant for the scale of its economy in comparison 
with its partners. At the same time, the core and the determining economic force of the EEU is the 
Russian economy and, therefore, the state of Russia’s economy directly affects the main 
macroeconomic parameters of member-states as well as ensures the course of integration.153 
Nevertheless, the experts believe that in the period of the economic crisis and Western sanctions, 
the integration format of the EEU enabled the Russian economy (as well as its partners within the 
EEU) to reduce the level of economic losses through the growth of Russian exports (mainly due 
to the price factor and the openness of borders in 2014-2016). Cooperation within the EEU and 
the creation of common markets on a sectoral basis ensure the growth of product quality.154 Among 
the arguments in favor of the positive impact of the EEU for the Russian economy is the prospect 
of the access to the migration resources of partner states and, what is more important, the creation 
of unified rules for the regulation of migration flows, which simultaneously contributes to the goal 
of economic and security development.  
Thus, Russia’s ideal foreign policy and economic position in the future is economically 
developing Eurasian power that plays a central role in Eurasia through the economic and military-
political integration with Asian and European countries.155 Russia sees itself as a guarantor of 
peace and stability in Eurasia and as a country that has constructive and friendly relations with its 
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main neighbors in the west, east, and southeast. Economically, but mentally, Russia should be not 
the eastern periphery of Europe, but the northern part of big Eurasia.156  
  
                                                




This study addressed the issue of trends and discourses that are predominant among the 
Russian political elite and foreign policy experts dealing with the post-Soviet space. It also 
analyzed Russian perceptions and narratives of the US-led world order, with attention to both 
Russia’s role and to Russia’s mission in the post-Soviet space in order to better understand Russia’s 
future direction in the region. Drawing primarily from the Russian political elite’s statements, 
popular discourses in Russia, and the expert community analysis, this research shared what is the 
original Russian perceptions of the world order, threats, and its narratives of post-Soviet space. It 
also identified debates that currently dominate in the Russian society and the expert community 
regarding Russia’s policy in the region. 
The research revealed that there is a problem of incomplete perception of contemporary 
Russia in the United States. In comparison with the Cold War era, when the US was greatly 
involved in studying the Soviet Union, today the American expertise lacks a precise vision of non-
Soviet Russia and the factors that drive Russia in the region. This is mainly due to the lack of 
consistent study of Russia in the United States in the 1990s and early 2000s. As a result, the United 
States relies mostly on familiar approaches and narratives that were used in regards to the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War.  
Misunderstandings between the U.S. and Russia stem from divergent fundamental values 
and state interests, as defined by both countries. The American vision originates from liberal values 
while the Russian vision proceeds from prioritizing the state, sovereignty, and the sense of 
patriotism. On top of that, Russia is represented as a “neo-Soviet autocracy” ruled by Vladimir 
Putin. There is also a predominant stereotype of “good Russian people vs. bad Russian 
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government” in the U.S. In other words, the American establishment separates the Russian 
political elite from the Russian people; however, Russian public polls show a high level of the 
approval of President Putin activities. Moreover, there are different versions of the end of the Cold 
War between Russia and the United States. Therefore, both countries incline to fundamentally 
misunderstand each other. This incomplete perception of the Russian perspective prevents the U.S. 
from making precise conclusions and obtaining objective understanding of contemporary Russia. 
Now that Russia is again a challenge, the American establishment does not exactly know how to 
properly and effectively react and respond to Russia’s actions in the region.  
Over the past two decades, Russia has been consistent in its narratives about the world 
order and its role in it. The Kremlin repeatedly stated the dangers of a U.S.-led unipolar system 
and the need for the multipolar world order. From the Russian perspective, the past twenty-five 
years have witnessed an increasing expansion of the threat coming from a predominance of US 
power. The perception of threat arose as a result of a number of events in the post-Cold War era, 
such as the war in Yugoslavia, Iraq, “color revolutions,” the Arab Spring, and the increasing 
presence of NATO troops on Russia’s borders. The majority of Russians, tired of the social 
instability and transformations taken place in the 1990s, fear that something like that can happen 
in Russia again.  
To some extent, Russia inherited the Soviet vision of the world in terms of the language of 
strength and balance of power. Thus, it perceived NATO expansion, US active support of 
democracy in other countries, especially the “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet area, as 
threatening. This is a natural reaction for the country that has been expanding its borders and 
creating buffer zones in neighboring territories for the past 500 years in order to ensure its own 
security. In the minds of Russians, NATO represents the military alliance aimed against the Soviet 
 65 
Union. But the Soviet Union collapsed and there is no Cold War anymore, so why does NATO 
still exist and, even more, why is it expanding? Hence, Russians conclude that NATO is against 
Russia. Therefore, when NATO began expanding eastward to act at its own discretion in the zones 
that Russia historically regards as part of itself, or at least its zones of influence, Russia resisted 
the expansion from the outside and had to react. But from the Russian point of view, their reactions 
are always defensive, not offensive. The security issue is the main driving reason that forces Russia 
to be involved militarily.  
Moscow sees the world in terms of the Westphalian model in which a nation-state has 
exclusive sovereignty over its territory and whose sovereignty must be respected. While Russia 
claims so, its actions in former Soviet countries show the opposite. It is because the majority of 
the Russian population still perceive former Soviet states, particularly Ukraine and Belarus, as part 
of one whole unit, “one people.” Russian perception of post-Soviet space as part of itself still 
prevailing in Russian society is psychic in nature and it is imbued with the concept of the Russian 
World. These issues were evident on multiple levels of analysis, such as the state, Russian expert 
community, and popular moods in Russia. 
Russia does not consider itself as a European country anymore; instead, it started to 
recognize itself as a Eurasian power, a significant part of Greater Eurasia. The idea of Greater 
Eurasia represents the replacement of the imperial idea by the concept of Russia as a great power 
which focuses on its own needs and status. It has a strongly marked economic character and its 
primary task is the internal development of Russia. Russia began to pursue a more pragmatic policy 
towards its neighboring countries, promoting the expansion of Russian capital in the region 
through regional institutions, such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. Moscow understands that without a strong economy, Russia cannot be a leading 
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world power, and thus, it stands for openness and international cooperation. But this cooperation 
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